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SINCE  THE DOLLAR'S decline in 1985, opinion has been divided about 
prospects for the U.S.  trade deficit. Pessimists have argued that the 
weak industrial  competitiveness of the United States and the barriers 
against  its exports, particularly  in Japan,  prevent  the U.S. trade  deficit 
from significantly  responding  to the dollar's  depreciation.  These views 
reject other economists' explanations  of the trade deficit, which have 
emphasized the role played by macroeconomic factors rather than 
foreign  protectionism  and  industrial  policies. Some other "pessimistic" 
economists have argued,  on empirical  grounds,  that  the response of the 
trade deficit would be small because importers  have been unusually 
willing  to absorb  the impact  of the weaker  dollar  in their  profit  margins. 
Still others have argued, on theoretical  grounds, that the strong, pre- 
1985  dollar  itself could  have damaged  the economy's capacity  to respond 
to the eventual fall of the exchange rate-a  phenomenon known as 
"hysteresis." I Hysteresis occurs, according to these views, because 
the appreciation  of the dollar  forces U.S. firms  to reduce capacity and 
induces foreign firms to invest in distribution  facilities in the United 
States. Therefore, when the dollar returns  to lower levels, U.S. firms 
have less industrial  capacity  than  when the cycle began  while foreigners 
remain  entrenched  with "beachheads"  in the U.S. market.  Moreover, 
once foreigners have entered the market, U.S.  firms find their own 
pricing  power  permanently  reduced.2 
This paper  reflects work in progress  on my study of U.S. manufacturing,  financed 
by the Ford Foundation.  I would like to thank Mariko  Noda and Kashif Mansori  for 
superb  research  assistance, and Charles  L. Schultze  for comments. 
1. See Baldwin  (1988);  Dixit  (1989a,  1989b);  Krugman  (1989a,  pp. 36-75). 
2. In addition,  those using an absorption  approach  have argued  that without  major 
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Optimists,  by contrast,  have  argued  that  conventional  models  system- 
atically underestimate  the long-run impact of exchange rate shifts. 
Because conventional estimation techniques operate with extremely 
long lags, they allegedly cannot pick up the effects of exchange rate 
shifts. Proponents  of this view have bolstered their case with studies 
that  compare  absolute  costs of production  internationally.  The broadest 
of the studies, based on purchasing  power parity (PPP) calculations, 
suggests that by 1987  the dollar had become much too weak.3 Studies 
that  focus more  narrowly  on manufacturing  costs indicate  that  unit  costs 
in the United States have been considerably  lower than those in other 
industrial  countries.4  Other  grounds  for optimism  have been improved 
U.S. productivity  growth in manufacturing  in the 1980s  and increased 
foreign investment  in U.S. manufacturing,  which has raised the possi- 
bilities  for import  substitution. 
Macroeconomic modelers who use conventional techniques have 
fallen  between  the two extremes. While  they had,  at one point,  estimated 
that  the dollar's  decline  would result  in a substantially  improved  current 
account by 1989,  they also indicated  that if growth rates in the United 
States and the rest of the world  were to be the same and if no additional 
real depreciation  was assumed, the current  account  deficit  was unlikely 
to fall below $110  billion.5 
As it happened,  in the immediate  aftermath  of the dollar's  decline in 
1985  the U.S. current  account  deficit  continued  to grow, increasing  from 
$122.3 billion in 1985 to $162.3 billion in 1987. It appeared  as if the 
pessimists were correct.6  But since 1987,  the deficit  has been shrinking, 
having  fallen to an annualized  figure  of $79.3 billion  by the first half of 
reductions  in the fiscal  deficit,  the current  account  would  show only limited  improvement. 
Sachs (1988),  for example,  argues  that  the trade  balance  improves  by about  40 percent  of 
any decline in the budget  deficit.  The decline  in the fiscal deficit  between 1986  and 1988, 
by 1.5 percent of GNP, was insufficient  to eliminate the trade deficit. According  to 
McKinnon  (1984), who uses an absorption  framework,  in a world of capital mobility, 
exchange  rate changes  are both unnecessary  and unlikely  to affect the current  account. 
For a rejection  of this view see Krugman  (1989a,  pp. 19-35). 
3. According  to the OECD,  in 1987,  the PPP  value  of the dollar  was 213  Japanese  yen 
(the actual  exchange  rate was 145);  2.5 deutsche  marks  (actual  rate was 1.8);  7.4 French 
francs  (actual  rate  was 6.0). See OECD,  Main  Economic  Indicators,  various  issues. 
4.  See, for example,  Hooper  (1989). 
5. See Bryant  (1988). Cline (1989)  projected  a base-case current  account deficit of 
$124.4  billion  in 1990. 
6.  See, for example,  Krugman  and  Baldwin  (1987). Robert Z. Lawrence  345 
1990.  Does this recent behavior  refute those pessimists who have been 
arguing  that major  declines in the dollar or other structural  changes 
should  have been required  for the trade  balance  to fall? Does it support 
the optimists  who suggest that conventional  model builders  have seri- 
ously underestimated  the long-run  boost current  exchange rates would 
provide? Is the current account likely to continue its decline, even 
without  further  depreciation  of the dollar?7 
In this paper, I address these questions and present evidence sup- 
porting  a view of the  trade  adjustment  process similarto  the  one described 
by conventional  modelers.  In  order  to evaluate  recent  trade  performance 
more  clearly,  I first  adjust  the data  for  measurement  problems  associated 
with computer  prices. With the cleaner data, I use equations that are 
estimated  over the pre-1985  period to track U.S. trade  performance  in 
the second half of the 1980s. My results indicate that hysteresis and 
other  structural  factors  have not inhibited  the adjustment  process. Trade 
prices have responded  symmetrically  to both the dollar's appreciation 
and its depreciation.  In addition, trade volumes have responded pre- 
dictably to relative prices and economic activity. In the second half of 
the 1980s, the U.S.  economy grew sufficiently slowly, relative to its 
trading  partners,  to offset long-run  growth  in the trade  deficit  that might 
have resulted from differences in activity elasticities. If the growth 
differential  of the past three years continues and relative  prices remain 
constant, the U.S. balance  of trade  in goods and services (excluding  oil 
imports  and  agricultural  exports) should  change  very little. 
In the last part of the paper  I look at two other issues that are often 
raised  in discussions  about  the U.S. balance  of payments.  First, there  is 
no evidence to support the claim that U.S.-Japanese trade has been 
particularly  unresponsive to the price of the dollar. Second, some 
evidence indicates  that the real burden  of the rise in U.S. international 
indebtedness  has been lower than  expected. 
Trade Performance 
As reported  in table 1, the U.S. trade  deficit  in goods and services has 
been shrinking steadily since  1987. The merchandise trade deficit, 
7. For  a recent  treatment  of these questions,  see Mann  (1990). vO o  n 
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measured  on a national  income  accounts  basis, has declined  from  a peak 
level of $159.5  billion  in 1987  to $114.9  billion  in 1989  and  $93.0  billion  in 
the  first  half  of 1990.  Since 1987,  the surplus  in nonfactor  income services 
(simply  referred  to as services, unless otherwise  noted)  increased  $18.8 
billion. Surprisingly,  for a nation that borrowed an additional  $284.3 
billion  between the end of 1987  and mid-1990,  the balance  in net factor 
payments (including  government  interest) fell only $2.9 billion. Thus, 
the $83.1  billion  decline in the current  account  deficit  mirrored  the $82.4 
billion  increase  in the balance  for goods and services.8 
Since 1987,  the trade  balance  has increased  in virtually  all major  end- 
use categories  except for  petroleum  products  and  computers.  The largest 
improvements  have been in capital  goods, up $34.6  billion, about  half  of 
which is aircraft;  nonpetroleum  industrial  supplies,  up $19.7  billion;  and 
services, up $18.8 billion. Table 2 shows the trade figures by end-use 
category. 
The behavior  of petroleum  imports  and agricultural  exports is suffi- 
ciently  idiosyncratic  as to warrant  separate  treatment.  Accordingly,  this 
paper will concentrate on the trade balance in goods and services 
excluding  oil imports  and agricultural  exports (the nonoil and nonagri- 
cultural,  or NONA, balance).  The exclusions do not alter  the size of the 
deficit changes. Between 1987  and the first half of 1990,  the respective 
declines in the trade  deficit  are similar  whether  oil imports  and agricul- 
tural  exports are included  or not. 
Measurement  of Computer Prices 
One other complicating  feature of the data is the peculiar  treatment 
of computer  prices in the trade accounts.9  Table 3 shows the effect of 
including  and excluding  computers  when changes in the principal  trade 
aggregates-nonagricultural  exports and nonoil imports-are  broken 
8. Thus, Cline  projects  a decline in U.S. net foreign  income  from 1987  to 1992  of $39 
billion  as net external  debt rises by $513.0  billion  between  the end of 1987  and  the end of 
1991;  in an alternative  model, he calculates  an even larger  decline in net earnings  from 
factor  services. See Cline  (1989). 
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Table 3.  Effect of Computers on Changes in U.S.  Trade,  1980-90 
Percent 
Including  Excluding 
Category  Measure  computers  computers 
Nonagricultural  exports  value  74.4  73.0 
price deflator  12.0  27.7 
quantity  62.5  45.3 
Nonoil imports  value  94.8  92.5 
price deflator  10.3  23.8 
quantity  84.5  68.7 
Trade balance  value  -20.4  -  19.5 
price deflator  -  1.7  3.9 
quantity  -22.0  - 23.4 
Sources:  Values  and implicit price deflators are BEA  data taken from DRI and OECD data bases.  Quantities  are 
calculated  from value  and price indexes.  Percent changes  are calculated  from the differences  in logarithms in each 
category from the beginning to the end of each  period. 
down into changes in prices and quantities.'0  Interestingly,  over the 
decade the rise in the value of imports  exceeds the value of exports by 
around  20 percent, whether  or not computers  are included."I  One must 
look more closely, at the price and volume changes, in order  to see the 
impact  of computers. While export and import  prices, as measured  by 
their  deflators  in the GNP accounts, increased  by 12.0  and 10.3  percent 
respectively, the volume of imports  rose 22.0 percentage  points more 
than  the volume  of exports. These findings  suggest  the presence  of some 
measurement  problem.  In particular,  these data  indicate  that  import  and 
export  prices rose much less than the U.S. producer  price index for all 
finished  goods, which  rose 33.6 percent  over this period.  The suspicions 
are  confirmed  when computers  are excluded  from  the data, as in the last 
column  of table  3. The results  show that  export  and  import  deflators  rise 
10. Expressing  the deficit  as a ratio  (C) of nonagricultural  exports to nonoil imports 
allows  a logarithmic  decomposition  of changes  into price  and  quantity  components, 
if C =  V,/V,,, 
then ln C = ln V, - ln  V,, 
= In  Q.,  + In  P,  -  In  Q,,l  -  In  P,,; 
and, Aln C =  Aln Q, +  Aln P., -  Aln Q,, -  Aln P,,,. 
11. In 1980,  when the ratio  between nonagricultural  exports  and nonoil imports  was 
1.  1, the NONA balance  was a surplus  of $21.6 billion.  By the first  half  of 1990,  the ratio 
was  0.87  and  the NONA deficit  stood  at $49.3  billion. 350  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 2:1990 
much faster when computers  are excluded, while the growth  in export 
and  import  volumes  is correspondingly  reduced. 
Computers  have such a large impact  because the nominal values of 
computer  exports and computer  imports  have grown rapidly  while the 
relative price of computers  has  declined  drastically.  This  unusual  behav- 
ior can be explained  by the dramatic  technical change experienced by 
the  computer  industry;  this  phenomenon  contributes  to the measurement 
problems  seen in  the trade  data.  To estimate  the volumes  of the computer 
trade,  the  Bureau  of Economic  Analysis  (BEA)  has  constructed  ahedonic 
price index for computers, and uses this one index to deflate  the value 
of computer  exports, computer  imports,  and producers  durable  equip- 
ment. This treatment  of computers by the BEA makes it difficult  to 
interpret  U.S. trade data. As shown in table 4, the BEA index, which 
uses 1982  as its base year, had fallen to 29 by 1990.  This decline in the 
deflator  has produced  an explosive increase in the estimated  volume of 
computer exports and imports. As a result, the overall deflators for 
exports and imports of goods and services have risen more slowly. 
Furthermore,  because exports and imports of computers have both 
risen, the effect on the trade  balance  is less dramatic.  Over the decade, 
a $2.1 billion worsening in the nominal  trade balance becomes a $4.6 
billion  improvement  when measured  in 1982  prices. 
The effect of computers  on broader  price indexes poses problems  for 
most models that try to explain trade  performance  by estimating  trade 
volumes and  prices separately.  It is no wonder  that, as Ellen Meade  has 
shown, models in which computers  are disaggregated  outperform  those 
in which they are not.12 It is also not surprising  that analysts who have 
tried to explain trade price behavior using the official deflators have 
found peculiarities  after 1985. The failure of the equations to predict 
prices accurately has presented major forecasting problems.'3  As it 
happens, some models based on these deflators  had price elasticities 
close to one, and  so were relatively  accurate  in forecasting  trade  values, 
since price and quantity  errors  offset one another.  14 
Daniel  Citrin  as well as Peter  Hooper  and  Catherine  Mann  shows that 
when fixed-weight  price indexes, which include the hedonic measures 
of computer  prices, are used in place of implicit  deflators,  most econo- 
12.  Meade (forthcoming). 
13.  See the discussion  of the Hooper-Helkie  model in Cline (1989). 
14.  Bryant (1988). 00  ~  ~~~~~~~  n0 
0  ,\  aN  ON  a  000000  0- ko  oooobo  i- 
-d 
CD  CD  00  \o  W  0t  n'r\c  00 
00  0<=  m 
0 
\C 
4  W  4  \Q  60 
C's 
.?  m~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~. 
0 
00  CN  ef)  fn  C)  00  0  - 
CA)  Ei~~~~~~~~04  E' 
44  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  '00)4)  0 
O~~~~N  O~~~~~ 
CZ~  0  41) 
0A0 




0  -  Y 
~44 
_  o-  o  00-  e  4  oo  4  4  4  403 
X  t  drd^<  Ot--??O??  U~~~~~~w  t 
o  0 
U  = 
0  t  -  I)C  1  44  x=  4 
4)0.a 
a  O  44C  3 
444)r 
_  o  o  t~^  ~O d-  -  = .~  g 
0  qQ  >  Ido  0  e  Ct 
OU  000000000000s  4)4404 352  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1990 
metric  problems  disappear.  '5 Indeed, Hooper and Mann  found that the 
effect of the weaker  dollar  on import  prices  after 1985  matched  historical 
experience. 
Although  better  than  implicit  deflators,  the BEA's fixed-weight  price 
indexes are not entirely satisfactory  for use in trade estimation. First, 
these fixed-weight  price indexes use the same hedonic price series for 
export and import prices of computers. Even if we accept that the 
hedonic price measure  is appropriate  for computers  used in the United 
States, it may not be appropriate  for either exports or imports  because 
the mix of products  traded  internationally  is different.  Recognizing  this, 
the Bureau  of Labor  Statistics (BLS) has constructed  price indexes for 
computer  exports and  imports  that are based on conventional  matched- 
model techniques. The BLS measures indicate a major divergence 
between export and import  prices. Between 1982  and 1990,  the nonhe- 
donic BLS computer  export  pricesfell by 13  percent, while nonhedonic 
computer  import  prices  rose  by 10  percent  (see table 4).  16 
Second, even with appropriate  price measures,  when product  mixes 
shift fixed-weight  price measures cannot fully explain the behavior of 
trade volumes, nor can they be used to deflate trade values.'7  Implicit 
deflators  (or ideally chaini-weighted  deflators)  would measure volume 
changes  better. But when deflators  are used as independent  variables  in 
a regression  that explains trade  volumes, they can bias the coefficients 
because any error  in price  measurement  will create an offsetting  error  in 
volume measurement. 
Although  there  is no clear solution  to these problems,  I address  them 
by omitting  computers  from my regression  analysis. I also generate  my 
own price indexes for various import  and export categories and for a 
broad measure of domestic prices with which to compare them. The 
end-use  price  series are  formed  by splicing  the BLS end-use  price  series, 
which are available after mid-1983,  with the BEA fixed-weight  price 
indexes. The end-use price series and the fixed-weight deflators for 
exports and  imports  of services are aggregated  using  three-year  moving 
15. See Citrin  (1989)  and  Hooper  and  Mann  (1989). 
16. For a more extensive discussion see Meade (forthcoming).  The BEA follows a 
similar  practice  with  aircraft.  Both  exports  and  imports  are  deflated  by the same  measure. 
See Parker  and  Bernstein  (1990). 
17. Indeed, the Federal  Reserve Board  model  introduces  a "bridging"  equation  that 
converts  their  prediction  of trade  prices  into a forecast  of the trade  deflator  for use in the 
equations  that  forecast  trade  volumes. Robert Z. Lawrence  353 
Figure  1. U.S. Real Exchange  Rate Indexes,  1980-90 
Index  (1980=  100) 
150- 
-.0*:,  '  \  IMF  effective 
110  /  effective  indexex 
100  C  Z  ef^clvi 
140  -.II 
1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990 
Year 
Source:  IFS data base and J.P.  Morgan's World Financial  Markets,  vanous  editions.  The base  year,  1980, applies 
to all indexes.  The  IMF  effective  index  is  based  on  weights  derived  from  the  IMF's  Multilateral Exchange  Rate 
Model.  The Morgan  real  index  is an index  of the real  exchange  rate  measured  against  15  other  industrialized  nations' 
currencies;  the Morgan  real effective index is measured  against 18 industralized  and 22 less-developed  nations' 
currencies. 
averages  of lagged  end-use trade values for weights. To obtain  a broad 
measure  of domestic prices, each end-use category has been matched 
against a series in the producer  price index (PPI). The PPI series have 
been aggregated  using th  e  sam  weights as the import price series.18 
These price series represent an effort to account for compositional 
changes  without  introducing  a major  simultaneity  bias into the price  and 
volume measures. In what follows, the price series are referred  to as 
"constructed"  price  indexes. 
Price Behavior 
Figure 1 shows changes in several widely used measures  of the real 
effective exchange rate, and reveals that by the first half of 1990 the 
dollar  had more or less returned  to its 1980  level. If the trade balance 
18. Unfortunately,  the PPI is not reported  by major  end-use  category. For example, 
the trade  end-use  category  for capital  goods excludes  automotive  products  while they are 
included  in the domestic  series. 354  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1990 
Table 5.  Alternative Price and Cost Indexes, Foreign and Domestic,  1980-90 
Index (1980  =  100) 
Constructed  indexesa  Foreign  Foreign 
export  unit 
Export  Import  Export  Import  Domestic  price  labor 
Year  deflator  deflator  prices  prices  prices  indexb  costb  PPfc 
1980  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
1981  108.2  103.3  109.2  102.8  106.2  98.4  98.5  110.3 
1982  112.1  102.1  111.5  101.2  109.1  94.7  95.9  115.3 
1983  111.7  100.0  110.7  99.4  110.8  92.5  93.0  117.4 
1984  112.5  98.8  112.6  99.1  113.1  92.0  88.3  119.0 
1985  109.9  96.7  112.1  97.9  114.3  90.6  87.1  120.6 
1986  108.7  102.2  112.0  105.6  116.6  102.4  105.4  117.5 
1987  107.8  106.6  116.3  115.0  120.4  113.5  118.3  119.9 
1988  110.0  112.5  122.6  124.4  125.2  123.0  129.9  122.7 
1989  112.4  111.7  126.0  126.7  129.6  125.1  130.9  128.9 
1990  112.6  110.8  130.2  130.6  131.4  129.5  134.7  132.8 
Sources:  DRI and OECD data bases,  and author's own calculations.  Figures for 1990 are annualized from January- 
June  data.  The  price  measures  for  exports  are  for  nonagricultural,  noncomputer  goods  and  services.  The  price 
mea5ures for imports are for nonoil,  noncomputer  goods  and services. 
a.  Price  indexes  are constructed  by the author from BLS  and BEA  disaggregated  price  indexes  as described  in 
text. 
b.  Foreign values  refer to all other OECD  nations. 
c.  The PPI is the index for all nonagricultural finished goods,  excluding  food. 
responds  symmetrically  to rises and  falls in the exchange  rate, we would 
expect that import  and  export  prices would  have returned  to about  their 
1980 levels  relative to domestic prices. This is precisely what has 
happened. 
Table 5 indicates that when computers  are excluded from the price 
calculations,  the constructed  export and import  price series grow by 30 
and 31 percent over the decade respectively. This is in contrast  to the 
deflators  for nonagricultural  exports and  nonoil  imports,  which increase 
only 13 and 11 percent. Thus, by the end of the 1980s, U.S. exporters 
had restored  both their profit  margins  and their relative price competi- 
tiveness. The 30 percent rise in U.S. export prices matches the growth 
in the U.S. domestic  price  level (up  31  percent),  the producer  price  index 
for finished goods excluding food (up 33 percent), and the OECD's 
manufactured  export price index of U.S. competitors  (up 30 percent). 
The rise in U.S.  import prices matches the rise in domestic prices, 
foreign  unit labor costs, and foreign  export prices measured  in dollars. 
Thus, by the late 1980s,  foreigners  who had  been competing  in the U.S. 
market  had  lost a relative  price advantage  that  had  been associated  with 
the strong  dollar.  As a result, the relative  profitability  of exporting  to the Robert Z. Lawrence  355 
Table 6.  Ratio of Alternative Import Price Indexes to Domestic Price Index 
by End-Use Category, 1987-90 
Ratio (1980  =  100) 
Import price  Year 
Category  measure  1987  1988  1989  1990 
Total imports 
Goods  and services,  nonoil  implicit  86  87  84  82 
fixed-weight  91  94  93  92 
constructed  93  96  95  95 
NONC  goods  and servicesa  implicit  93  97  96  96 
fixed-weight  93  97  96  95 
constructed  96  99  98  98 
End-use category 
Capital goods  implicit  68  67  63  59 
fixed-weight  89  92  90  90 
constructed  92  95  93  93 
Capital goods,  noncomputer  implicit  96  101  102  103 
fixed-weight  104  108  107  106 
constructed  96  100  98  99 
Food  implicit  97  94  86  87 
fixed-weight  97  94  86  87 
constructed  101  96  89  90 
Nonoil  industrial supplies  implicit  73  79  79  78 
fixed-weight  73  79  79  78 
constructed  79  84  82  80 
Autos  implicit  112  116  117  117 
fixed-weight  112  116  117  117 
constructed  114  119  120  120 
Consumer goods  implicit  90  92  90  90 
fixed-weight  90  92  90  90 
constructed  92  94  93  93 
Source:  Author's  own  calculations  using  OECD  and  DRI  data  bases.  Constructed  import and  domestic  price 
indexes  are calculated  by  the author as described  in the  text.  Figures  for  1990 are annualized  from January-June 
data; the data are seasonally  adjusted.  Import price measures  are the implicit deflator, the fixed-weight deflator, and 
the author's constructed  index. 
a.  NONC  represents  nonoil and noncomputer  imports. 
United States, compared  with other destinations, returned  to its 1980 
level. 
Table  6 illustrates  the  difference  that  alternative  import  price  measures 
make  on various  categories  of imports.  The table  gives ratios  of selected 
import price indexes to the constructed domestic price index. For 
aggregate  nonoil  imports,  the relative  prices in 1990  are 18  percent  lower 356  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1990 
than  their 1980  levels when implicit  deflators  are  used and  only 8 percent 
lower when using the fixed-weight  index, which includes the hedonic 
price series for computers. By giving computers  a smaller  weight, the 
fixed-weight  measure  eliminates  most, but not all, of the relative  weak- 
ness in import  price  growth.  The constructed  import  price index, which 
uses the (nonhedonic)  BLS series rather  than the (hedonic)  BEA com- 
puter  price  series, shows relative  import  pricesjust  5 percent  below their 
1980  level. With  computers  excluded from  the aggregate-as in several 
end-use categories in table 6-all  three price indexes show that 1990 
relative import  prices are near their 1980  levels. These measures also 
show that, like the real exchange rate, relative import prices have 
remained  in a narrow  range  in 1988,  1989,  and  the first  half  of 1990.  Table 
6 also reports on the differences among alternative  price measures in 
individual  end-use  categories.  In  every end-use  category  except "capital 
goods, noncomputer,"  the constructed  price series rises more over the 
decade than  either  the deflator  or fixed-weight  price series.  '9 
The relative price of automobile imports deserves special notice. 
Jagdish Bhagwati argues that the voluntary export restraint (VER) 
arrangements,  which have regulated the imports of Japanese autos, 
should  have led to higher  prices in the early 1980s.  As long as the VERs 
were binding,  there should have been no further  price increases when 
the dollar declined. Thus, Bhagwati suggests that VER quotas would 
inhibit  adjustment  to the lower  dollar.20  The  evidence, however, suggests 
that while he may have been correct in theory, in practice  he was not. 
Between 1980  and 1985, relative auto-import  prices were actually un- 
changed, but between 1985  and the first half of 1990  they increased  by 
20 percent. 
Explaining Import and Export Prices 
Table  7 reports  the results  of regressions  that  explain  the constructed 
indexes of export  and  import  prices. The export price  equations  regress 
nonagricultural,  noncomputer  export  prices on a constant,  the U.S. PPI 
for finished goods excluding food, and foreign export prices.2' The 
equations  perform  well. Fitted to data  from 1976  and 1984,  the equation 
19. For  a more  extensive discussion  see Alterman  (forthcoming). 
20. Bhagwati  (1988). 
21. Foreign  export  prices  are  expressed  in U.S. dollars,  as measured  by the OECD. Robert  Z. Lawrence  357 
tracks  export  prices  out of sample  accurately.  The  prediction  errors  over 
the  eleven semiannual,  out-of-sample  observations  have a mean  absolute 
error  of 0.5 percent. In the first half of 1990,  the equation  predicts the 
level of export  prices  with  an  error  ofjust 0.3 percent.  It suggests  nothing 
unusual  about  the pricing  of U.S. exports  in the second half  of the 1980s. 
Over time, taking  foreign prices as given, each 1 percent appreciation 
(depreciation)  in the dollar exchange rate lowers (raises) U.S. export 
prices measured  in dollars  by 0.24 percent. 
The import  price equations  in table 7 explain U.S. nonoil, noncom- 
puter (NONC) import  prices as a function of foreign  export prices and 
U.S. domestic prices. The equations  suggest  that after  about  a year, 70 
percent  of the change  in foreign  prices  is passed  through  into U.S. import 
prices. Although  the residuals  of the equations  are autocorrelated,  the 
coefficients change little whether or not the equation is corrected for 
autocorrelation.  In table 7, as in all subsequent  tables, the appearance 
of a rho summary  statistic  indicates  that the equation  was corrected  for 
autocorrelation. 
The regression  has small standard  errors  within sample. And when 
fitted  between 1976  and 1984,  it tracks well out of sample with a mean 
absolute  error  ofjust 1.7  percent,  without  systematic  over- or underpre- 
diction. It underpredicts  NONC import  prices in the first  half  of 1990  by 
just 2.3 percent.22 
Explaining Import and Export Volumes 
I now turn  to explaining  trade  flows, both by estimating  equations  for 
trade  volumes  and, as an  alternative,  for import  values. All the equations 
have been estimated  using semiannual  data  from 1976  to the first  half  of 
1990.  The sample  period is determined  by the availability  of computer 
price  data.  All variables  are  specified  in  logarithms  so that  the coefficients 
may  be interpreted  as elasticities. 
IMPORTS. In equations  8.1 and 8.2 in table 8, the quantity  of NONC 
imports  of goods and services is explained as a function of real GNP, 
potential  GDP,  and  distributed-lagged  values  of the ratio  of nonoil  import 
prices to U.S. producer  prices. The coefficients on relative prices are 
estimated  using  a second-order  Almon  lag specification. 
22. This result  contrasts  with Meade, who finds  that, despite exclusion of computer 
prices, prices tend to be overpredicted.  She speculates that there are problems  in the 
specification  of the Hooper-Helkie  model,  which  uses consumer  prices. ote, 
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Table 8.  Regressions Explaining Nonoil, Noncomputer Import Volumes, 1976-90 
Real  imports of goods  and services, 
nonoil,  noncomputer 
1976:1-1990:1  1976:1-1984 :2  1976:1-1990:1  1976:1-1984:2 
Independent  variable  8.1  8.2  8.3  8.4 
Constant  -  14.95  -15.75  -  14.45  -15.01 
Potential GDP  0.73  0.25  0.89  0.45 
(3.0)  (0.7)  (4.0)  (1.4) 
Real GNP  1.81  2.39  ...  ... 
(7.9)  (7.9) 
Real domestic  ...  ...  1.58  2.09 
demand volume  (8.1)  (8.9) 
Relative  import pricesa 
Current  -  0.47  -  0.65  -0.40  -  0.56 
(3.2)  (3.5)  (2.8)  (3.5) 
One lag  -0.32  -0.38  -0.21  -0.19 
(4.9)  (4.1)  (3.4)  (2.6) 
Two  lags  -0.23  -0.19  -0.11  0.02 
(2.1)  (1.6)  (1.0)  (0.2) 
Three lags  -  0.20  -0.09  -0.11  0.07 
(3.2)  (0.9)  (1.6)  (0.7) 
Four lags  -  0.23  -  0.06  -0.21  -  0.03 
(1.5)  (0.3)  (1.3)  (0.2) 
Sum of lags  -  1.47  -  1.37  -  1.03  -0.68 
(14.3)  (9.1)  (8.6)  (3.8) 
Summarv statistic 
R  2  0.996  0.998  0.996  0.999 
Standard error  0.021  0.018  0.021  0.016 
Durbin-Watson  1.4  2.2  1.2  2.5 
Out-of-sample 
prediction  error  1985:1  1985:2  1986:1  1986:2  1987:1  1987:2 
Equation 8.2  - 0.027  - 0.048  -.0.021  0.022  0.009  0.010 
Equation 8.4  -  0.006  -  0.028  -0.004  0.028  0.024  0.020 
Mean 
Out-of-sample  absolute 
prediction  error  1988:1  1988:2  1989:1  1989:2  1990:1  error 
Equation 8.2  -0.020  -0.026  -0.056  -0.068  -0.070  0.031 
Equation 8.4  -0.014  -  0.033  -  0.059  -  0.074  -  0.067  0.032 
Source:  Author's  own  calculations  using  DRI  and  OECD  data  bases.  The  base  year,  1982, applies  to  all  real 
values.  All data are semiannual; all variables are expressed  in logarithms.  Numbers  in parentheses  are t-statistics. 
a.  Relative  import price figures, excluding  oil and computer  trade,  are the ratio of  the author's  own  import and 
domestic  price indexes.  A second-order  Almon  lag of relative  import prices was  specified over  five periods with no 
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Equation  8. 1, fitted  over the entire  sample  period, indicates  that  over 
the long run, when actual and potential  output grow at the same rate, 
each 1 percent increase in output  will be associated with a 2.5 percent 
increase  in the volume  of NONC imports,  the sum  of the coefficients  on 
actual and potential  output. For each percentage  point deviation from 
this path, imports  will deviate by 1.8 percent  in the same direction.  The 
price effects, for their part, generate  a J curve in the short run. In the 
first year, a 1 percent increase in relative import prices will reduce 
volumes by only 0.8 percent. After eighteen months, however, the 
volume reductions  will outweigh  the price increases. Over the long run 
(two and a half years), import  volumes will decline by 1.5 percent. The 
equation  tracks import  volumes within sample  with a standard  error  of 
just 2.1 percent. However, there is serial autocorrelation  in the error 
term. 
In equation  8.2, fitted over the subsample  1976-84, the estimates of 
the cyclical effects are somewhat  larger.  Each 1  percent  deviation  of real 
GNP from its potential is associated with a 2.4 percent deviation of 
imports  in the same direction. However, the estimate of the long-run 
impact of growth is virtually unchanged. When actual and potential 
output grow at the same rate, each 1 percent increase in output is 
associated with a 2.6 percent  increase in import  volumes. The estimate 
of the price elasticity over the long run is slightly  lower than it was for 
the full sample  equation.  But the equation  puts more  of the price effects 
in the first  and second periods. 
When equation 8.2 is used to forecast out of sample, it has a mean 
absolute error of 3.1 percent from 1985 to the first half of 1990. The 
equation tracks imports accurately through the second half of 1988, 
when the overprediction  is just 2.6 percent. In 1989  and the first  half of 
1990,  however, the equation  overpredicts  import  volumes  by an average 
of 6.5 percent.  The negative  errors,  or overpredictions,  certainly  contra- 
dict the pessimists who have claimed hysteresis would reduce the 
responsiveness of import  volumes to relative price changes. To some 
extent,  the results  support  the optimists  who believe that  the U.S. import 
growth  coefficients  might  be slowing. 
The last two equations  in table 8 report  an alternative  specification  in 
which  the volume of real domestic demand-the  sum of real consump- 
tion, real  investment,  and  real  government  expenditures-is used as the 
short-run  activity variable.  This specification  yields lower estimates  for 362  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1990 
the price  elasticities  but similar  long-run  income  elasticities. It indicates 
even more strongly  that import  volumes have been unexpectedly low 
since the second half  of 1988. 
IMPORTS:  A  NOMINAL  SPECIFICATION.  Thus far I have presented 
equations  both  for an import  price  index that  does not correspond  to the 
import  price  deflator  and  for an import  quantity  that  has been estimated 
using  the official  nonoil,  noncomputer  import  deflator.  Although  instruc- 
tive, the product  of the price  and  quantity  forecasts  from  these equations 
does not equal the nominal value of imports. To obtain a complete 
system capable  of forecasting  nominal  trade  values  from  these equations 
would require  forecasting  the implicit  deflator.  As an alternative,  table 
9 presents  equations  explaining  nominal  imports  directly. 
The first pair of equations, 9.1 and 9.2, explains nominal, nonoil 
imports  of goods and  services as a function  of nominal  GNP and  relative 
import  prices. Computers  are  included  here;  import  prices  for  computers 
use the BLS measure.  The equation  works  well and  has a standard  error 
of 2.4 percent over the period 1976-90. The implied relative price 
elasticity is - 0.4, and  the coefficients  indicate  a J-curve  effect in which 
higher  relative  import  prices raise the value of imports  in the first  year, 
then more than offset this effect over the following eighteen months. 
Fitted between 1976  and 1984,  the equation  tracks  import  values out of 
sample with remarkable  accuracy. In the first half of 1990,  the error  is 
just 0.2 percent,  demonstrating  the predictability  and  structural  stability 
of the import  equation. 
An alternative  specification,  shown in equations  9.3 and  9.4, explains 
nominal, nonoil merchandise  imports as a function of nominal  goods 
output.  Again  the performance  is extremely  satisfactory.  In the first  half 
of 1990, the out-of-sample  error is 0.1 percent. Thus, all told there is 
some evidence that  import  volumes are weak, but it is hard  to argue  that 
U.S. nonoil  import  values are way off track.23 
EXPORTS.  To explain  nonagricultural,  noncomputer  (NANC) export 
volumes, I use domestic  demand  in the rest of the world  (basically  other 
OECD countries)  weighted  by its 1980  share in U.S. exports. Relative 
export  prices are defined  as the distributed  lagged  values of the ratio  of 
U.S.  nonagricultural  export prices-formed  by weighted averages of 
nonagricultural  end-use price series-to  foreign manufactured-goods 
23. For a more rigorous  evaluation  of the accuracy of trade equation forecasting 
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Table  9. Regressions  Explaining  Nominal,  Nonoil  Import  Volumes,  1976-90 
Nonoil imports  of  Nonoil merchandise 
goods and services  imports 
1976:1-1990:1 1976:1-1984.:2  1976:1-1990:1 1976:1-1984:2 
Independent  variable  9.1  9.2  9.3  9.4 
Constant  -4.22  - 3.09  - 3.86  - 3.08 
GNP  1.43  1.45  ...  ... 
(106.7)  (38.4) 
Goods output  ...  ...  1.67  1.66 
(114.4)  (44.1) 
Relative  import  pricesa 
Current  0.53  0.53  0.65  0.59 
(3.3)  (2.4)  (4.3)  (2.9) 
One lag  0.12  0.09  -0.03  -0.11 
(1.8)  (0.9)  (0.5)  (1.2) 
Two lags  -0.18  -0.24  -0.42  -0.48 
(1.4)  (1.4)  (3.5)  (3.0) 
Three lags  -0.38  -0.46  -0.51  -0.53 
(5.6)  (4.1)  (8.0)  (5.1) 
Four lags  - 0.47  - 0.58  - 0.32  - 0.25 
(3.0)  (2.3)  (2.1)  (1.1) 
Sum of lags  - 0.38  - 0.67  - 0.62  -0.79 
(3.2)  (3.0)  (5.5)  (3.9) 
Summary  statistic 
R  2  0.998  0.997  0.998  0.997 
Standard  error  0.024  0.028  0.023  0.026 
Durbin-Watson  1.7  1.9  2.2  2.5 
Out-of-sample 
prediction  error  1985:1  1985:2  1986:1  1986.2  1987:1  1987:2 
Equation  9.2  - 0.033  - 0.045  -0.032  0.007  - 0.008  0.006 
Equation  9.4  - 0.036  - 0.056  - 0.036  - 0.034  - 0.060  - 0.035 
Mean 
Out-of-sample  absolute 
prediction  error  1988:1  1988.2  1989:1  1989.2  1990:1  error 
Equation  9.2  0.008  0.032  0.012  0.024  0.002  0.027 
Equation  9.4  - 0.029  - 0.005  -0.000  0.007  0.001  0.019 
Source:  Author's  own  calculations  using DRI data base.  All data are semiannual;  all variables  are expressed  in 
logarithms. Numbers  in parentheses  are t-statistics. 
a.  Relative  import price figures, excluding  oil and computer  trade,  are the ratio of the author's  own  import and 
domestic  price indexes.  A second-order  Almon lag of relative  import prices was specified  over  five periods with no 
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export prices as  measured by the OECD. The price coefficient is 
estimated  using a third-order  Almon-lag  specification  over six periods. 
Again, estimates are reported  for the span 1976-90, and for 1976-84. 
This specification  performed  better  than, but similarly  to, ones that use 
a gap measure  for the rest of the world  or some measure  of U.S. export 
market  growth. 
Equation  10.1  in  table 10  tracks  NANC export  volumes  with  a standard 
error  of 2.1 percent. Each 1 percent increase in foreign demand  raises 
U.S.  NANC exports by 1.6 percent. The long-run  price elasticity on 
U.S. exports  is 1.1, with  the effects spread  out fairly  evenly over the full 
three-year  period. Estimates using lags longer than three years, which 
are not reported  in the table, do not add to the equation's  explanatory 
power. 
The coefficients remain  fairly stable when the specification  is esti- 
mated  without  correction  for first-order  serial  autocorrelation  (equation 
10.2), and over the subsample  period 1976-84 (equation 10.3). When 
estimated  over the subsample,  the equation  tracks  exports  out of sample 
with considerable accuracy. The mean absolute error of the eleven- 
period  forecast is 2.7 percent, which compares  quite  favorably  with the 
in-sample  standard  error  of 1.9 percent. The larger  errors  in the out-of- 
sample  forecast occur between the first halves of 1986  and 1987,  when 
U. S. export  volumes  were  higher  than  predicted.  Thereafter  the equation 
tracks  NANC volumes  well; in the first  half  of 1990,  it indicates  that  they 
were just 1.3 percent higher than might have been expected. Taken 
together with the price forecast from equation 7.3,  which indicates 
export prices were just 0.3 percent higher  than expected, this system 
has no trouble  explaining  export  behavior. 
Interpretation  of Empirical Results 
The coefficients on the GNP terms in import equations like these 
could be interpreted  as pure  income elasticities  under  the assumption  of 
both imperfect  substitution  and infinite  supply  elasticities  of importable 
goods both at home and abroad.  But, as has long been recognized, it is 
likely that, given their relatively crude formulation,  these "activity" 
effects capture not only pure income effects, but also the impact of 
supply-side  effects and nonprice  influences. Nonprice influences, such 
as product  quality,  variety, and innovation,  affect trade  flows in a fairly Robert Z. Lawrence  365 
Table 10.  Regressions Explaining Nonagricultural, Noncomputer Export Volumes, 
1976-90 
Real exports  of goods and services, 
nonagricultural,  noncomputer 
1976:1-1990:1  1976:1-1990:1  1976:1-1984.:2 
Independent  variable  10.1  10.2  10.3 
Constant  2.93  2.90  3.45 
Foreign demand volume  1.60  1.60  1.58 
(33.7)  (40.5)  (12.8) 
Relative export pricesa 
Current  -  0.32  -  0.30  -  0.21 
(2.7)  (2.7)  (1.2) 
One lag  -0.04  -0.05  -0.02 
(0.4)  (0.5)  (0.1) 
Two lags  -  0.08  -  0.09  -  0.15 
(1.0)  (1.1)  (1.4) 
Three lags  -  0.22  -  0.22  -  0.36 
(2.8)  (2.8)  (3.4) 
Four lags  -0.29  -0.29  -0.40 
(3.0)  (0.3)  (3.3) 
Five  lags  -0.09  -0.09  0.00 
(0.7)  (0.7)  (0.0) 
Sum of lags  -  1.05  -  1.04  -  1.13 
(12.2)  (14.5)  (8.5) 
Summary  statistic 
Rho  0.243 
R  2  0.989  0.989  0.991 
Standard error  0.021  0.021  0.019 
Durbin-Watson  2.0  1.5  1.7 
Out-of-sample 
prediction  error  1985:1  1985:2  1986:1  1986:2  1987:1  1987:2 
Equation  10.3  0.036  -0.006  0.059  0.074  0.054  0.011 
Mean 
Out-of-sample  absolute 
prediction  error  1988:1  1988:2  1989:1  1989:2  1990:1  error 
Equation 10.3  0.014  -0.024  0.004  -0.007  0.013  0.027 
Source:  Author's  own  calculations  using  DRI and OECD  data bases.  All data are semniannual;  all variables  are 
expressed  in logarithms.  Numbers  in parentheses  are t-statistics. 
a.  Relative export  prices are defined as the ratio of the author's  own  nonagricultural, noncomputer  export  price 
index and the foreign export  price  index  for all other OECD  countries.  A third-order Almon  lag of  relative  export 
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steady fashion; they are, therefore, difficult  to separate  out from pure 
income effects.24  Because these equations fail to provide an adequate 
structural  description  of import  determination,  they are not well suited 
for projecting  the effects of growth. Efforts must be made to capture 
supply-side  effects more explicitly and successfully than the equations 
do.25  Accordingly, the equations should be viewed as statistical sum- 
maries  of the relationship  between endogenous  variables,  rather  than  as 
strict  structural  models  of income  effects.26 Nonetheless, the differences 
in elasticity  do help detect the role of long-run  declines in U.S. compet- 
itiveness, and help forecast under  the assumption  that the relationships 
between these variables  continue  to hold.27 
Consider  the NANC export equation 10.2 together with the NONC 
import equation 8.1.  The comparison reveals the long established 
Houthakker-Magee  effect that similar  rates of long-run  growth in the 
United States and the rest of the world are associated with a declining 
trade balance or continuous real dollar depreciation.28  Over the long 
run, my regression  equations  suggest that the activity elasticity of U.S. 
exports is 1.6 while the activity elasticity of U.S. imports  is 2.5. Thus, 
with unchanged  relative  prices, rates  of growth  in the United States that 
are about 60 percent of those abroad  are required  to keep exports and 
imports  growing  at similar  rates. Surprisingly,  perhaps,  the coefficients 
on the demand variables in equations 8.3 and 10.1 indicate that the 
effects on trade  of cyclical changes in the United States and the rest of 
the world  are quite similar.29 
OVERALL  FORECASTS.  Taken  as a system, the equations  fitted  over 
the period 1976-84  forecast  the behavior  of the U.S. nonoil, nonagricul- 
tural,  noncomputer  (NONANC)  trade  balance  over  the  rest  of the decade 
fairly  accurately.  When  the forecasts of the price  (equations  7.3 and  7.7) 
and  volume  (equations  8.2 and 10.3)  are  combined  with  the actual  values 
for the independent  variables  and U.S. import  and export deflators,  the 
24. See Goldstein  and  Khan  (1985). 
25. Meade  (forthcoming)  reports  that  the proxy  used by Hooper  and  Helkie  to capture 
these effects, relative  capacity  growth  in the United States and the rest of world, is no 
longer  significant  when  computers  are  dropped  from  the regressions. 
26. Krugman  (1989b)  gives  atheoretical  explanation  for  an  inverse  relationship  between 
import  elasticities  and  growth  rates. 
27. For  a more  complete  discussion  see Lawrence  (1988). 
28. Houthakker  and  Magee  (1969). 
29. Similar  results  are  obtained  by Marquez  (1988). Robert Z. Lawrence  367 
result is a forecast of the nominal  NONANC balance  of $82.1 billion  in 
the first  half  of 1990  compared  with the actual  value of $51.8  billion.  The 
forecast  of NANC exports is remarkably  accurate-the  predicted  value 
of $459.3  billion  matches  the actual  value of $459.2  billion.  All the error 
in forecasting  the 1990  trade  balance  comes from the overprediction  of 
NONC imports:  the predicted  value  of $541.5  billion  exceeded the actual 
value of $511.0  billion. 
ALTERNATIVE  GROWTH  PATHS.  In a 1988 study, Ralph Bryant uses 
five major  econometric  models to construct a base-case projection  for 
the current  account through 1991.30  His projection  forecasts a current 
account deficit of $108 billion in 1989 and $113 billion in 1990. The 
projection was based on the assumption that after 1987, annual real 
growth in the United States and Europe would average 3.0 percent, 
while  Japanese  growth  would  average  3.5 percent.  In fact, between 1987 
and 1989  annual  growth  in Europe and Japan  averaged  3.5 percent  and 
5.2 percent  respectively. The United States, on the other  hand,  grew by 
only 2.6 percent  annually. 
When equations 8.1 and 10.2 are used to forecast trade using the 
growth rates assumed in the Bryant simulations  and the actual values 
for relative prices and import and export deflators, they predict a 
NONANC deficit  of $99.5  billion  for the first  half  of 1990  compared  with 
the $68.9 billion  forecast when the equations  use actual  growth  rates in 
the United  States  and  the  rest  of the world.  Thus,  the  differences  between 
projected  and actual growth rates can explain $30.5 billion in smaller 
deficits.  This  is sufficient  to account  for  the difference  between  the actual 
current  account deficit of $79.3 billion in the first half of 1990  and the 
forecast  in the Bryant  base case. 
Trade Performance  in the 1980s 
Over the decade as a whole, the growth in real GNP in the United 
States was somewhat  lower than the growth in real GDP abroad:  30.4 
percent in the United States compared  with 34.9 percent abroad. In 
addition,  at the end of the decade, relative  U.S. export  and  import  prices 
were  roughly  back  to their  1980  levels, and  have  remained  fairly  constant 
over the past three  years. Thus, it is clear, in an approximate  sense, that 
the  Houthakker-Magee  effect is confirmed.  With  relative  prices  basically 
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the same  in 1990  as they were in 1980  and  with somewhat  slower  growth 
rates at home than abroad,  the U.S. NONANC trade  balance  declined 
over the decade  by $75.2  billion.  Measured  logarithmically,  the coverage 
ratio  (the ratio  of nominal  exports to nominal  imports)  declined by 19.5 
percent. In one sense, this decline measures  the loss of U.S. competi- 
tiveness over the decade. A rough  calculation  suggests  that  restoring  the 
NONA coverage  ratio  to its 1980  level would  have  required  a depreciation 
of roughly 13 percent over the past three years. Such a depreciation 
would have reduced the NONANC deficit by $96 billion. Even if one 
ignores  the boost to agricultural  exports and direct  foreign  investment, 
the improvement  would  have been sufficient  to balance  the U.S. current 
account  in the first  half  of 1990.31  Of course, there  is nothing  necessarily 
optimal  about  the 1980  coverage  ratio.  In 1990,  the  ratio  implies  a nominal 
NONANC balance  of about  $40  billion,  compared  with  a nominal  balance 
of $19 billion in 1980. To restore the nominal NONA balance to $19 
billion, a devaluation  of only 10  percent  would have been needed. Prior 
to the recent  invasion  of Kuwait,  the trade  balance  in  agricultural  exports 
and oil imports  had improved  by $14 billion  over the decade. Restoring 
the trade  balance  in goods and services to its 1980  nominal  level would, 
therefore,  have required  a devaluation  of only 8.0 percent. 
Regression equations 8.1 and 10.2 can be used to decompose the 
NONANC coverage ratio. To begin, the value of exports, Vx,  is deter- 
mined  by the price and quantity  of exports. The same holds true  for the 
value of imports, Vm. Thus, V, = PXQ.  and Vn,  = PmQm, whereP  denotes 
price and Q the quantity  of exports (x) and imports  (m). Further, 
(1)  lnV,  -  lnV,,  =  lnPf  -  lnP,n +  lnQ.  -  lnQ,Z 
As specified, regression equation 10.2 for NANC goods and services 
indicates  that 
(2)  lnQ,  =  a, lnFDV  -  a2 lnPf* +  er, 
31. The equation  system above indicates  that a 1 percent  depreciation  of the dollar 
would lower relative U.S. export prices by 0.7 percent  and raise export prices in U.S. 
dollars by 0.3 percent. Thus, using the export price elasticity of 1.05, each 1 percent 
depreciation  would  raise export  values by 1.04 percent.  Devaluation  would raise import 
prices  by 0.7 percent  and,  given  an  elasticity  of 1.47,  lower  quantities  by 1.03  thus  reducing 
import  values  by 0.33  percent.  Scaled  by the  first  half  of 1990  values,  each 1  percent  decline 
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where  FDV is the foreign  demand  volume,  P* represents  relative  NANC 
export prices, and e, is the residual. Similarly  regression  equation  8.1 
for NONC goods and services indicates  that 
(3)  lnQm =  a3 lnGNP82 +  a4 lnGDPp,, -  a5 lnP* +  e,n, 
where GNP82 and GDP,O,  represent  real and potential output respec- 
tively, P* represents  relative  NONC import  prices, and  e is the residual. 
Equations  2 and  3 can be substituted  into equation 1 to yield 
lnV,  -  lnVm  =  alInFDV  -  a3lnGNP82  -  a41nGDPp,, 
(activity  effect) 
-  a2lnP*  +  a5lnP* 
(4)  (price  effect) 
+  lnPx  -  lnPm 
(terms  of trade  effect) 
+  ex  -  en 
(residual). 
The results of such a decomposition are given in table 11, which 
reports  changes  in the NONANC coverage  ratio  over the 1980s.  During 
this period, the equation  system accurately  tracks U.S. trade  perform- 
ance, and confirms  that price effects have no impact on the coverage 
ratio  over this period.  The terms  of trade  effects are relatively  small  and 
positive for the decade as a whole (2.0 percent), and are partially  offset 
by a small residual  of - 0.6 percent. The dominant  impact, therefore, 
comes from  the activity  effects. These account  for almost  the entire  21.5 
percent  logarithmic  decline in the coverage  ratio. 
The decomposition  exercise also offers some interesting  insights  into 
the  fluctuations  in the coverage  ratio  over the decade. Between 1980  and 
1985,  the large decline in the coverage ratio reflects the effect of faster 
growth  in the United States and the impact  of the strong  dollar, which 
was partially offset by  improvements in the U.S.  terms of  trade. 
Typically, as the price equations indicate, with a dollar appreciation 
import  prices, expressed in dollars,  tend  to fall and  export  prices to rise. 
In the second half  of the decade, relatively  slower growth  in the United 
States has offset most of the differential  in activity elasticities, so that 370  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1990 
Table 11.  Decomposition of Imports and Exports by Price and Quantity,  1980-90 
Percent 
Total change 
1980-90  1980-85  1985-90  1985-87  1987-90 
Imports 
Value  95.0  50.9  44.0  26.0  18.0 
Deflator  26.2  -0.8  27.1  14.8  12.3 
Quantity  68.7  51.8  16.9  11.2  5.7 
Price  -  2.1  17.8  -  19.9  -7.1  -12.9 
Income  71.7  34.6  37.1  16.0  21.1 
Error  -0.9  -0.7  -0.3  2.3  -  2.6 
Exports 
Value  73.4  6.5  66.9  24.5  42.4 
Deflator  28.2  15.0  13.2  3.6  9.6 
Quantity  45.2  -  8.6  53.8  20.9  32.9 
Price  -2.0  -22.1  20.1  7.7  12.3 
Income  48.7  15.5  33.2  13.4  19.8 
Error  -  1.6  -2.0  0.5  -0.3  0.8 
Balance 
Value  -21.5  -44.5  22.9  -  1.5  24.4 
Terms of trade  2.0  15.9  -  13.9  -  11.2  -2.8 
Quantity  -  23.5  -  60.4  36.9  9.7  27.2 
Price  0.1  -  39.9  40.0  14.7  25.2 
Income  -  23.0  -  19.1  -  3.9  -  2.5  -  1.4 
Error  -0.6  -  1.4  -0.8  -2.6  -  3.4 
Source:  Author's  own  calculations  using DRI data base.  The price and income  decompositions  of the changes  in 
quantity are generated  with equations  1-4 in the  text  and with regression  equations  10.2, for exports,  and 8.1,  for 
imports.  Percent  changes  are derived  from differences  in logarithms from beginning  to end  of  period.  Figures  for 
1990 are annualized from January-June data; the data are seasonally  adjusted. 
the  decline  in  the dollar  has  been  associated  with  a near  complete  reversal 
in the effects of both negative  relative  prices and  positive terms  of trade 
from  the first  half  of the decade. 
The dollar's decline after 1985  has operated in two distinct phases. 
Between 1985  and  1987,  the nominal  coverage  ratio  changed  little  because 
the negative terms of trade effects associated with the dollar's decline 
almost  offset the positive relative  price  effects. But since 1987,  when the 
dollar stabilized  at lower levels, the improvement  has been extensive 
because  by that  time the terms  of trade  effects from  the depreciation  had 
been almost fully absorbed. Thus, only the positive lagged impact of 
lower relative U.S. prices remained.  Between 1987  and the first  half of 
1990, the 2.6 percent annual rate of growth in the United States was Robert  Z. Lawrence  371 
60 percent  of the 4.4 percent annual  rate of expansion  in the rest of the 
world. This differential  was nearly sufficient to compensate for the 
impact  of different  activity elasticities. 
Adjustment  in Trade with Japan 
Conventional  wisdom  has it that  while U.S.-European  trade  adjusted 
dramatically  to changes in the exchange rate, U.S.-Japanese trade has 
experienced  only minor  adjustments.  Indeed, many  point  to this alleged 
failure  as reason to manage  U.S.-Japanese trade. The evidence, how- 
ever, does not support  this argument. 
Typically, those who claim Japanese trade has not adjusted  to the 
dollar's  depreciation  rely on trade  balance  data. As reported  in table 12, 
the bilateral  U.S. trade deficit with Europe declined from a surplus  of 
$20.6  billion  in 1980  to a deficit  of $20.6 billion  in 1987,  a total decline of 
$41.2  billion.  By the first  half  of 1990,  however, this  balance  had  reverted 
to an annualized  surplus  of$10.5 billion.  By contrast,  the bilateral  deficit 
with Japan  increased  by $46.2 billion  between 1980  and 1987,  more  than 
the decline with Europe. Furthermore,  the subsequent  improvement  in 
U.S.-Japanese trade has been quite minor;  between 1987  and 1989  the 
deficit shrank  by just $7.3 billion  from $56.3 billion to $49.0 billion. In 
addition,  while Japan  accounted  for 37 percent  of the overall  U.S. trade 
deficit  in 1987, it accounted  for 45 and 42 percent of the deficit in 1988 
and 1989  respectively. 
What has been overlooked in this debate, however, is the fact that 
bilateral  trade balances will be affected by both the level of the initial 
imbalance  and the subsequent  rate of adjustment.  For example, in 1987 
U.S. exports to Japan  totaled $28.2 billion and were one-third  the size 
of U.S. imports  from  Japan;  thus, U.S. exports  to Japan  would  have had 
to grow  three  times as fast as imports  from  Japan,  simply  for the balance 
to remain  unchanged. By contrast, in the same year U.S. exports to 
Europe  equaled  $60.5 billion,  or 74.5 percent  of total U.S. imports  from 
Europe.  For  the  trade  balance  with  Europe  to remain  unchanged,  exports 
to Europe  would  have had  to rise only 1.3  times as rapidly  as imports.  A 
large initial ratio of imports to exports, therefore, entails a slower 
adjustment  in the deficit measure. Since 1987, changes in the bilateral 372  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1990 
Table 12.  United States: Trade Performance,  1980-90 
1980  1985  1987  1989  1990 
Trade  balance (billions  of dollars) 
U.S.-world  -  19.5  -  126.5  -  152.1  -  108.6  -93.0 
U.S.-Japan  -  10.1  -46.2  -56.3  -49.0  -39.2 
U.S.-Europe  20.6  -  18.8  - 20.6  1.5  10.5 
Exports 
U.S. to world (billions  of dollars)  225.7  218.8  254.1  364.4  390.6 
Percent  to Japan  9.2  10.3  11.1  12.2  12.1 
Percent  to Europe  26.1  22.4  23.8  23.8  25.6 
Ratio, Japan/Europe  0.35  0.46  0.47  0.51  0.47 
Imports 
World  to U.S. (billions  of dollars)  245.3  345.3  406.2  472.9  483.6 
Percent  from  Japan  12.6  19.9  20.8  19.8  17.8 
Percent  from Europe  15.6  19.6  20.0  18.0  18.5 
Ratio, Japan/Europe  0.81  1.02  1.04  1.10  0.96 
Manufacturing  trade 
'Balance  (billions  of dollars) 
U.S.-world  27.7  -90.1  -  124.5  -  103.2  -77.8 
U.S.-Japan  -21.5  - 55.8  - 67.6  - 66.9  - 55.4 
Exports 
U.S.-world (billions  of dollars)  160.7  167.8  200.0  276.4  300.2 
Percent  to Japan  5.6  7.4  8.2  9.6  9.9 
Imports 
U.S.-world (billions  of dollars)  133.0  257.9  324.9  379.6  378.0 
Percent  from Japan  22.9  26.4  25.8  24.6  22.5 
Source:  U.S.  Department of Commerce.  Figures for United States in 1990 are annualized from January-June data. 
Figures for Japan in 1990 are annualized from January-May data. For 1989 and 1990, Japanese figures for manufacturing 
trade are based on Japanese  trade data. 
deficit  with Japan  actually  say more about the initial  ratio of exports to 
imports  than  any subsequent  adjustment. 
Indeed, as table 12 reports, between 1987  and the first half of 1990, 
the dollar  value of U.S. exports to Japan  grew more rapidly  than U.S. 
exports in general, and as rapidly  as U.S. exports to Europe. Over the 
same period, U.S.  imports from Japan grew less rapidly than U.S. 
imports  in  general,  and  U.S. imports  from  Europe  in  particular.  Similarly, 
between 1987 and 1990  Japan accounted for a growing share of U.S. 
manufactured  goods exports  and  a declining  share  of U.S. manufactured 
goods imports. In short, both export and import  performance  indicate 
that  Japan  has adjusted  more than  Europe  and other trading  partners  of 
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At the margin, Japanese imports respond to relative import price 
changes almost as sensitively as other countries.32  In addition, Japan 
shows signs of a structural  shift toward higher  import  income elastici- 
ties.33  While this evidence does not necessarily imply the absence of 
unusual  trade  barriers,  it does suggest  that, if present, they operate  like 
tariffs,  which  do not stifle  marginal  responses to exchange  rate  changes, 
rather  than  like quotas. 
Finally, the use of Japan's  share  of the overall U.S. trade  deficit  as a 
measure  of how much  Japan  has adjusted  is highly  misleading.  Note that 
in 1980, when the United States had an overall trade deficit of $19.5 
billion, Japan  accounted  for 51.7 percent of the deficit. This feature  of 
the trade balance results from a structural  component of the bilateral 
deficit  with  Japan.  Even if both  Japan  and  the United  States  had  balanced 
trade,  Japan  would  probably  still run  a surplus  with the United States in 
order  to offset its deficit  with OPEC.  Paradoxically,  the rising  Japanese 
share in the overall U.S.  deficit actually points to a return to these 
structural  levels rather  than a lack of adjustment  to the dollar's depre- 
ciation. 
The Burden of the Debt 
In 1981,  the United  States was the world's  largest  net creditor  nation. 
In table 13,  which shows the U.S. net international  investment  position, 
American assets abroad in that year exceeded foreign assets in the 
United States by $141.1  billion, and the United States earned  a surplus 
of $31.3 billion  in net foreign  income. Since 1981,  the United States has 
become the world's largest  net debtor  nation,  largely  because it has run 
large  trade  deficits.34  By the end of 1989,  the net investment  position of 
the United States was - $620.2  billion. In the first  half  of 1990,  U.S. net 
foreign  income had shrunk  to an annual  rate  ofjust $2.4 billion.35 
What  is really surprising  about  these numbers,  however, is how little 
U.S. net  foreign  earnings  have  fallen. Even though  Americans  borrowed 
32. See Lawrence  (1987)  and  Bosworth  (1990). 
33. See Petrie  (forthcoming)  and  Lawrence  (forthcoming). 
34. For  a more  extensive  discussion  of this concept, see Islam  (1988). 
35. Because  of data  problems,  some of which  are  discussed  below, the BEA stopped 
publishing  the net international  investment position in 1988, although  it still reports 
component  details.  See Scholl  (1990). .000 
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$761.3 billion  from foreigners,  their net annual  payments increased  by 
just $24.4 billion-suggesting an annual  interest rate burden  of just 3.2 
percent. To understand  this result, one must distinguish  between the 
behavior  of both payments  on the net debt that has been borrowed  by 
the U. S. public  sector, by banks,  and  by the  private  sector, and  payments 
on the net direct  foreign  investment  (DFI). 
Debt 
There is no real surprise  in the payments  on debt. The crude rule of 
thumb-a  method that works reasonably  well-applies  a single rate of 
interest to changes in the net position. More precise estimates require 
taking  account of two key elements that lead to a higher  return  on U.S. 
private, nondirect foreign investment assets than on U.S.  liabilities. 
First, because U.S. banks  generally  aim to earn profits,  rates of return 
on the foreign assets of U.S. banks tend to be higher  than the rates of 
interest  paid by U.S. banks  to foreigners.  Second, estimates of returns 
on stocks are  low because  they ignore  capital  gains. The fact that  foreign 
holdings in the United States have a higher  proportion  of stocks than 
U.S. holdings  abroad  contributes  to the higher  reported  return  on U.S. 
assets abroad. 
Between 1981  and 1989,  Americans  assumed a net additional  $599.2 
billion  in private  and government  non-DFI debt; their net payments  on 
this  debt  increased  by $46.2  billion.  This  indicates  an  average  incremental 
cost of 7.7 percent, which conforms  to the rule-of-thumb  procedure.36 
Direct Foreign  Investment 
An unexpected  finding,  however, lies in the net earnings  from direct 
foreign  investment.  Between 1981  and 1989,  foreigners  invested $162.0 
billion  more in the United States than Americans  invested abroad. By 
1988,  the United States was a net debtor in direct foreign investment. 
Yet, between 1981  and 1989  U.S. net earnings  from direct investment 
actually  increased  by $13.9 billion. 
One  part  of the explanation  is that  the official  data  severely  understate 
the real  value  of U.S. assets abroad,  investments  being  reported  at their 
36. Some caution is warranted  in interpreting  this figure  because banks that carry 
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historic  rather  than  replacement  cost. 37  Given  inflation  and  the deprecia- 
tion  of the U.S. dollar,  U.S. asset holdings  are  much  larger  than  officially 
estimated. At the end of 1988,  for example, Lois Stekler and William 
Helkie estimated  that U.S. DFI assets abroad  were $742  billion, rather 
than  the BEA book value  of $322  billion.38  U.S. earnings  on DFI of $49.8 
billion in 1988  imply a more plausible  rate of return  of 7.2 percent, if 
U.S. DFI mean  assets for 1988  are calculated  as the mean  of Stekler  and 
Helkie's 1987  and 1988  estimates.  Their  estimates  suggest  that  at the end 
of 1988  the U.S. net investment  position was - $190  billion  rather  than 
the official -  $533 billion. 
A second part  of the net earnings  picture  is more  intriguing.  It appears 
that foreign investment in the United States has been extraordinarily 
unprofitable.  Between 1981 and 1989, foreigners spent $292.4 billion 
acquiring  equity positions in U.S.-based firms  and setting  up their own 
subsidiaries.  Yet their  earnings  in 1989  were only $7.1  billion  higher  than 
they were in 1981.  All told, the rate  of return  on foreign  direct  investment 
in the United States was 5.6 percent in 1988, and only 3.8 percent in 
1989. Because these estimates are based on a historic cost basis, they 
overstate the rate of return  that would have resulted  had inflation  been 
taken into account. Indeed, the Stekler-Helkie estimates of foreign 
assets in the United States suggest a return  of 4.5 percent in 1988. In 
1987, the ratio of income to equity for U.S.  manufacturing  was 12.8 
percent  while the return  to foreign  direct investment  in manufacturing, 
valued  at historic  cost, was  just 5.9 percent.  Measures  of income  to sales 
confirm  the picture. Between 1983  and 1987,  the income-sales ratio on 
foreign  investment  in U.S. manufacturing  was 1.2  percent,  less than  half 
the average income-sales ratios for U.S. domestic manufacturers  (4.2 
percent)  and  U.S. direct  investment  abroad  (3.6 percent). 
One  interpretation  of these data  is that  American  managers  care  more 
about profits than foreign managers. This conclusion could, in turn, 
indicate  that  American-owned  firms  face a higher  cost of capital,  although 
this explanation contradicts the fact that foreign-owned  firms in the 
United States tend to finance  their operations  locally. A second inter- 
pretation  is that foreign investment  in the United States is a relatively 
37. For more extensive discussions see Eisner and Pieper  (1990);  Ulan and Dewald 
(1989);  and  Scholl  (1990). 
38. Stekler and Helkie (1989, p. 14b). Eisner and Pieper  (1990, p. 17) estimate the 
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new phenomenon  and will take time to become more profitable.  How- 
ever, this interpretation  may not be fully credible because returns  on 
foreign investment  in the United States have been low for a long time 
now. Finally,  there  is the  possibility  that  the data  are  erroneous,  possibly 
because  foreigners  deliberately  underreport  their  earnings  in the United 
States for tax or other  purposes. 
For some foreign investors, particularly  foreign governments, the 
incentive  to underreport  income  is presumably  high. Why  pay tax to the 
United States if you can avoid it? The underreporting  is most likely 
achieved by overstating  the costs of imported  components-a  practice 
known  as transfer  pricing.  Transfer  pricing  should  not affect the overall 
U.S. current  account  but can lead to an overstatement  of import  values 
and an understatement  of payments  on DFI. However, if tax evasion is 
the reason  that  companies  engage  in transfer  pricing,  it is surprising  that 
the  practice  would  have persisted  despite  the reduction  in  U. S. corporate 
tax rates in  1986. Companies from countries that do not tax their 
multinationals  on a global basis should have an incentive to report 
income  in the United  States  rather  than  at home. Nevertheless, whatever 
the reason, the decline in the U.S. current  account  has not been as large 
as might  have been expected. 
Table  14  indicates  that,  with  the  exception  of the  finance  and  insurance 
industries,  the low returns  are  pervasive.  The  table  also shows especially 
low returns  for investors  from  Germany,  France,  Japan,  Latin  America, 
and  the Middle  East, and  higher  returns  for investors  from  Switzerland, 
the United Kingdom,  the Netherlands,  and Canada. 
Inflation 
Just as gross domestic product (GDP) ignores depreciation  on do- 
mestically  held  assets, so may  it be appropriate  forgross  national  product 
(GNP)  to ignore  depreciation  on foreign-held  assets. Nevertheless, it is 
certainly  appropriate,  when using other measures of national  product, 
to account properly for changes in the real value of U.S.  net debt. 
Indeed,  erosion  in the real  value  of U.S. net debt  means  that  the increase 
in the real debt-servicing  burden  has been much less than reported  by 
the net-factor income measure. The official data fail to differentiate 
between interest  payments  on debt, which represent  genuine servicing 
payments,  and  those that  actually  compensate  owners  for  the inflationary 378  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1990 
Table 14. Equity,  Sales, and Income  of Direct  Foreign  Investment 
in the United  States, 1987 
Net income  Sales  Income!  Equitya  Income! 
(billions of  (billions of  sales  (billions of  equity 
dollars)  dollars)  (percent)  dollars)  (percent) 
Total direct  foreign  investment  9.9  731.4  1.3  217.8  4.5 
By industry 
Petroleum  1.3  74.5  1.8  26.2  5.0 
Manufacturing  4.9  220.7  2.2  83.5  5.9 
Wholesale  0.4  273.9  0.1  25.4  1.6 
Retail  trade  - 0.1  47.2  - 0.2  8.0  -  1.3 
Financeb  2.7  26.5  10.0  18.9  14.1 
Insurance  1.9  39.1  4.8  22.8  8.3 
Real estate  - 0.6  10.5  - 6.2  14.5  -4.5 
Services  - 0.6  18.0  - 3.3  9.0  - 6.6 
Other  0.0  21.0  0.0  9.6  0.1 
By investing  region or nation 
Canada  2.0  89.3  2.3  37.5  5.4 
Europe  7.1  387.0  1.8  120.4  5.9 
United Kingdom  4.6  130.4  3.5  42.5  10.7 
Netherlands  1.3  52.1  2.4  22.7  5.5 
Switzerland  0.7  37.6  1.9  9.7  7.5 
Germany  - 0.2  72.2  -0.2  20.8  -0.9 
France  -0.1  43.5  - 0.2  10.4  - 0.8 
Asia and the Pacific  0.6  206.1  0.3  36.7  1.6 
Japan  0.5  182.3  0.3  25.6  1.9 
Latin America  - 0.4  27.1  -  1.5  6.0  - 7.0 
Middle  East  -0.8  5.8  -  14.1  7.4  -  11.0 
Other  1.4  16.1  8.5  9.8  14.1 
Source: Bureau  of Economic  Analysis,  U.S. Department  of Commerce,  Foreign  Direct  Investment  in the U.S., 
1987 Benchmark Survey: Preliminary Results,  tables  5, 8,  B-2,  B-4.  Figures  represent all U.S.  affiliates of foreign- 
owned  firms,  and U.S. firms  with  over 10  percent  foreign  ownership,  with sales or equity  over $1 million  in 1987. 
a. Equity  is given as "total  owner's  equity." 
b. Finance  represents  all nonbanking  financial  activities. 
erosion of the value of their assets. In a world of 4 percent  inflation,  an 
8 percent  interest  payment  on debt to foreigners  should  be treated  as a 4 
percent  nominal  payment  and  a 4 percent  capital  outflow  (or  repayment). 
The magnitude of this effect for the United States can be roughly 
calculated  by estimating  the annual  decline in the real value of U.S. net 
international  debt obligations. Table 15 reports net debt positions- 
called net debt instruments-which exclude the holding  of equity. The 
U.S. net debt instrument  position is calculated  by excluding  the foreign 
stock holdings  of Americans  and the stock holdings  of foreigners  in the 
United States, on the grounds that these assets should move with 
inflation.  Similarly,  U.S. gold holdings  are excluded. r  >  O  W)  00  'Itt  (Z  4  44 
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How does one decide what price index to use when estimating  the 
impact of inflation?  One guide is the currency in which the debt is 
denominated.  In the case of the United States, roughly 80 percent of 
foreign  debt assets and liabilities  are denominated  in dollars.39  Thus, a 
dollar  price index is reasonably  suitable  for a first  pass at estimating  the 
size of this effect. Because debt earnings and payments in the GNP 
accounts are deflated  by the GDP deflator,  it seems appropriate  to use 
the GDP  deflator  for calculating  the effect. The results  of this adjustment 
are reported  in table 15. In 1980, the United States had a positive net 
debt  instruments  position  of $14.9  billion,  and  nominal  net  factor  income 
was $28.9  billion. Given  the inflation  rate  of 9 percent, there  was also an 
erosion of $1.3 billion in the value of the outstanding  assets. In 1989, 
when  net  factor  payments  were - $0.9  billion,  the  4.1 percent  inflationary 
erosion on outstanding  U.S. obligations  was worth $16.9 billion. Table 
15 also shows that the adjusted net factor income in 1989 was $16.0 
billion, only $11.5 billion lower than the adjusted  net factor income of 
$27.5  billion  in 1980.  Measured  in 1982  dollars,  real  net factor  income in 
1989  was $12.6  billion, $19.5  billion  less than  in 1980. 
The remarkable  fact, therefore, is that while the United States has 
become a large nominal  net debtor  over the decade, the real burden  of 
the debt has grown  by relatively  little. This should  not be that  surprising. 
In a world with real interest rates of about 3 percent, borrowing  an 
additional  $600  billion  will result  in real  interest  payments  of $18  billion, 
which represent  less than 0.4 percent  of U.S. national  income.40  More- 
over, additional  earnings  from U.S. net foreign  direct investment  have 
been sufficient  to offset the real  costs of additional  U. S. borrowing.  This 
finding  underscores  the conclusions  of those who have argued  that U.S. 
net foreign  borrowings  can be sustained. 
Conclusions 
The mysteries about recent U.S. trade performance  lie in the data, 
not in actual behavior. Once computers are excluded, conventional 
39. At the end  of 1989,  for  example,  U.S. banks'  liabilities  payable  in dollars  were  80.8 
percent  of their total liabilities.  Their claims in dollars  were 81.4 percent  of their total 
claims. See Survey of Current Business,  June 1990, pp. 58, 54. 
40. For  a more  extensive treatment  see Lawrence  (1988). Robert Z. Lawrence  381 
explanations  for changes in the U.S. NONA trade balance hold. Over 
the last decade, we have observed something close to a controlled 
experiment.  The real, effective dollar exchange rate at the end of the 
decade  roughly  equals its level at the start  of the decade. Growth  in real 
U.S. spending  has been similar  to growth  in real spending  abroad,  but 
the NONA balance in goods and services in the first half of 1990  was 
$70.9 billion  lower than in 1980.  This outcome is well explained  by the 
regression  results. 
The pricing  behavior  of U.S. exporters  and  of foreigners  who export 
to the United States has been predictable.  Relative export and import 
prices have responded symmetrically to  the dollar's rise and fall. 
Following the real exchange rate, relative prices had returned  to their 
1980  levels by the first half of 1990. Thus, when the lagged impact of 
relative price changes are taken into account, they play no role in 
explaining  changes  in the trade  balance  over the decade. 
Given relative  prices, the coefficients  in the regressions  imply  that if 
the United States  grows at 2.5 percent,  then nonagricultural  exports  will 
match the growth rate in nonoil imports  when growth abroad  reaches 
4.1 percent.41  For each percentage  point that foreign  growth  falls short 
of this growth rate, the real exchange rate would have to be 1 percent 
lower in order to keep exports and imports  growing  at the same rate. 
The decline in the NONA balance is a measure  of the erosion in U.S. 
competitiveness over the decade. For the NONA balance to have 
returned  to its 1980  nominal  level, the real  effective exchange  rate  would 
have had  to be about 10  percent  weaker  over the past three  years.42 
Regression  equations  fitted between 1976  and 1984  can account for 
U.S.  trade performance  over the following five years. Given foreign 
growth  and relative  export prices, predicted  and actual  growth  in U.S. 
cixport  volumes and prices have tracked each other closely. Over the 
41. The growth estimate of 2.5 percent for the United States seems a reasonable 
estimate  of its current  long-run  potential.  See Litan, Lawrence,  and Schultze  (1988),  and 
Garner  (1989). For a more optimistic  view, see the Economic  Report of the President 
(1990). 
42. Returning  the NONA coverage  ratio  to its 1980  level, a more  difficult  task, would 
require  a depreciation  of roughly  13  percent.  The  adjustment  of the real  effective  exchange 
rate  must, of course, be accompanied  by changes  in the nation's  savings  and investment 
flows.  The choice of mechanisms  by which  the dollar's  depreciation  is achieved  will have 
a major  impact  on the path  of the trade  balance. 382  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1990 
past eighteen months, there is evidence that U.S. imports  are growing 
more  slowly than  expected. 
In summary,  there is modest support  for those who believe direct 
foreign investment and other factors may have reduced the U.S. pro- 
pensity  to import,  but there is little support  for the pessimists who have 
claimed that U.S.  trade flows would not respond to exchange rate 
changes. In particular, conventional wisdom about Japanese trade 
adjustment  is incorrect.  Judged,  as it should be, by the growth  rates of 
Japanese  imports  and  exports,  U.S .-Japanese  trade  has  actually  adjusted 
more  rapidly  than  either  total U.S. trade  or trade  with Europe  alone. 
The behavior  of net factor income in the United States does contain 
surprises.  The apparent  average  rate of return  to direct foreign invest- 
ment in the United States has been very low, keeping  net factor income 
from changing  much despite a decade of large  current  account  deficits. 
If one corrects  the value of the U.S. net debt  for inflation,  the additional 
international  debt, measured  in real  terms,  assumed  by the United  States 
over the 1980s  has resulted  in a surprisingly  small increase in real U.S. 
international  debt-service  burdens. Comments 
and Discussion 
Peter  Hooper: Robert  Lawrence's  paper  makes  four  basic points. First, 
conventional  empirical  modeling  of U.S. trade flows has been compli- 
cated by the Bureau of Economic Analysis's hedonic price index for 
computers. Second, the behavior of U.S.  trade and current account 
balances  through  the first  half of 1990  can be reasonably  well explained 
by the conventional  models, whether or not they make special adjust- 
ments  for computers.  One  doesn't need to resort  to unfair  trade  practices 
or hysteresis  to explain  the continuing  U.S. external  deficit. 
Third,  the widening  of the U.S. external  deficit  over the past decade 
presents a bit of a mystery, since U.S. GNP has grown no more than 
foreign  GNP over that  period  and the dollar's  real exchange  rate is now 
almost back to its 1980  level. Lawrence's explanation  is based on the 
familiar  Houthakker-Magee  result-that the  trade  deficit  widens  because 
the income elasticity of imports is substantially  greater than that of 
exports. 
Fourth, even given a widening  deficit, there is no need for concern 
because the large  cumulative  external  deficits run  over the past decade 
have resulted in almost no increase in the real U.S. international  debt 
service burden. 
While  I enjoyed  the paper,  I also found  ample  room  for disagreement 
with  several  of the points  that  were made.  I will  begin  with  the discussion 
of computers.  As Lawrence  points out, BEA's treatment  of computer 
prices, as measured by the hedonic index, is potentially misleading 
because it assumes that the prices of imports, exports, and domestic 
shipments  of computers  are all one and the same. BLS data suggest, to 
the contrary, that movements in the prices of computer imports and 
exports have diverged  from one another. Lawrence  concludes that the 
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BLS data are preferable.  However, those data may significantly  over- 
state increases in the prices of both imports  and exports of computers 
because they do not factor in the tremendous  technological  advances 
that  have taken  place over the past decade. They still price by the box, 
if you will, rather  than  by the power or the capability  of the box. 
Using BLS data, Lawrence constructs a set of new aggregate  price 
indexes  for imports  and  exports.  The series that  he constructs  are  neither 
fixed-weight  indexes nor  deflators  (which  use moving-quantity  weights). 
Instead  he uses moving-value  weights, which, in principle,  could impart 
an inflationary  bias to those indexes. With  moving-value  weights, trade 
categories in which prices rise faster than average will tend to get an 
increasing weight over time, other things being equal, while those 
categories in which prices are rising slower than average will be given 
decreasing  weight. 
Lawrence  is careful  not to use his indexes to deflate  trade  values for 
use in his import and export quantity equations; to do so would be 
inappropriate.  But then one wonders why he constructed his price 
indexes in the first  place; why not  just use the BLS fixed-weight  index, 
or at least construct  a deflator  using  volume  weights? 
I fully agree  with Lawrence  that  the exclusion of computers  makes it 
easier to explain the movements in BEA's measures of the prices and 
volumes of imports and exports in recent years. This adjustment  is 
helpful  for the type of historical  accounting  exercise that he pursues  in 
the paper. However, this adjustment  does not help much  when models 
are put to the more stringent  test of policy simulation  and  forecasting- 
that is, when trade  in computers  can no longer  be treated  exogenously. 
In modeling  work at the Federal Reserve, we have found that because 
of difficulties  encountered  in  estimating  equations  for  trade  in  computers, 
one can do just as well predicting total trade flows with aggregate 
equations  as with disaggregated  equations. 
A final point on computers. I was struck that the rather lengthy 
treatment  of this issue in the paper stands alone; the implications  of 
computer  prices for trade modeling  do not seem to have much bearing 
on the more  central  issue of external  adjustment  raised  elsewhere in the 
paper. Lawrence points out elsewhere in the paper that conventional 
models that  do not adjust  for computers  (in particular  those surveyed  by 
Ralph Bryant) appear to have done reasonably well in predicting  the 
trade  balance. I might  note that several other models that do adjust  for Robert Z. Lawrence  385 
computers,  including  the one we have been working  with at the Federal 
Reserve, have been overpredicting  the trade deficit by a considerable 
margin  recently, particularly  by overpredicting  imports. Indeed, Law- 
rence's own equations that exclude computers overpredicted  imports 
by an increasingly  significant  margin  during  1989-90. 
Next, let me turn to the mystery surrounding  the widening of the 
external  deficit  over the 1980s  and Lawrence's explanation  for it based 
on the Houthakker-Magee  result. The mystery emerges only in the 
process of accounting  with partial-equilibrium  trade models. That ac- 
counting  asks why the external  deficit  should  be any greater  now than  in 
1980,  since its key determinants-relative income and relative  prices- 
are back to where they were in 1980. 
From the more fundamental perspective of  exogenous shifts in 
domestic saving and investment, the persistence of an external deficit 
should come as no surprise. The U.S.  structural  or full employment 
budget  deficit  is now much  greater  than  it was in 1980,  and the personal 
saving rate remains  well below its level of ten years ago. In fact, one 
might  wonder  why the external  deficit  continued  to narrow  as rapidly  as 
it did through  the first  half  of this year. 
In a general-equilibrium  framework,  of course, exogenous shifts in 
saving  and investment  are transmitted  to trade  flows through  changes  in 
income (or domestic demand)  and relative  prices. So the picture  we get 
from trade equations should be consistent. I will argue  that it is. U.S. 
GNP may have grown about the same as foreign GNP over the past 
decade, but U.S. domestic demand, or C +  I  + G, has risen about 4 
percentage  points more than that abroad.  If domestic demand  were the 
key activity variable  in trade  equations,  the difference  in demand  alone 
could explain most of the net widening  of the deficit. In addition,  while 
the dollar's real exchange rate may have returned  to its 1980  level (at 
least by some measures),  the relative  prices of imports  and  exports that 
enter  into trade  equations  have not. In the Federal  Reserve's model, the 
price of imports  relative to domestic U.S. prices has fallen somewhat 
more  over  the past  ten years  than  the price  of exports  relative  to domestic 
prices abroad.  Thus, imports  have been stimulated  more than exports 
by movements  in relative  prices. 
But  let us suppose  that  GNP is the relevant  activity  variable,  and  that 
most of the net increase in the trade deficit is left unexplained by 
movements  in relative  prices. The Houthakker-Magee  result  is only one 386  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1990 
of several plausible  explanations  for the observation  that U.S. imports 
tend to grow faster than U.S. exports, other things being equal. In a 
paper presented to this panel several years ago, Paul Krugman  and 
Richard  Baldwin  argued  that  after  accounting  for  the  influences  of income 
and relative prices, the U.S.  trade balance tended to show a secular 
decline.  ' They attributed  this decline and an associated secular  decline 
in the dollar's  real exchange  rate to the lagging  productivity  growth  and 
the diminishing  technological  edge of the United States relative to its 
trading  partners. 
Some of my colleagues  and  I have, for some time, been working  under 
the assumption  that  the Houthakker-Magee  result  really  reflects  longer- 
term supply-side  developments.  These developments  are inadequately 
represented  in movements in relative price variables but at the same 
time are strongly  correlated  with longer-term  trends in GNP. We have 
found that adding  supply  proxies to the equations  significantly  reduces 
the difference  in estimated  income elasticities. 
Just how one views this empirical  issue can affect one's view of the 
future  prospects of the external  deficit. For example, a slowing  of U.S . 
growth  relative  to growth  abroad  could have a strong  effect on the trade 
deficit if the income elasticity of the demand  for imports  is as high as 
Lawrence estimates. However, if part of that high elasticity actually 
reflects  the  effects of trends  in  foreign  supply,  the  effect  of lower  domestic 
growth  would be smaller.  Lawrence, who cites Ellen Meade's work as 
important,  observes that the significance  of relative  supply variables  in 
trade  equations  falls when computers  are taken out. However, they do 
remain  at least marginally  significant  in Meade's import  equation and 
they are quite significant  when computers  are removed. 
Several years ago, I argued  that the sharp  decline in the dollar  could 
stimulate ongoing supply-side shifts that would begin to reverse the 
secular downtrend  in the U.S. external balance. As Lawrence notes, 
there is some evidence in the recent improvement  in the trade balance 
to support  this view. However, the supply-side  view also predicted  that 
we would begin to see a shift in manufacturing  output  capacity toward 
the United States. This part of the prediction  does not appear  to have 
been realized;  the effects of the decline  in  the dollar  have been dominated 
by other  factors that have led to an investment  boom abroad  and not at 
home. 
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The  paper  concludes  on an  optimistic  note about  the effect of the large 
cumulative  U.S. external  deficits over the past decade on the U.S. real 
debt burden. The decline in U.S. real net foreign investment income 
caused  by the increase  in U.S. net debt to foreigners  has been relatively 
small.  According  to the estimates  presented,  U. S. real  net  foreign  income 
adjusted  for inflation  fell from over 1 percent of GNP in 1980  to about 
0.25 percent  of GNP in 1989.  Some would argue  that a decline equal to 
0.75 percent  of GNP is not trivial.  Moreover, these estimates probably 
understate  the potential  future costs of the debt that has already  been 
accumulated.  As Lawrence points out, U.S. residents have benefited 
from a substantially  greater rate of return  on their direct investment 
assets abroad  than what they pay on foreign-held  direct investment in 
the United States. The rate of payment  on foreign  direct investment  in 
the United States has been unusually low and has declined further 
recently, for any number  of reasons. But at least some of those reasons, 
including  the cyclical decline in U.S. domestic growth and corporate 
profits over the past year and a half, are likely to be reversed in the 
future.  When  rates  of return  eventually  begin  to rise toward  more  normal 
levels, the real  burden  of the external  debt incurred  by the United  States 
over the past decade will increase  as well. 
General Discussion 
Robert  Barro  questioned  the author's  basic approach.  He argued  that 
it is inappropriate  to estimate  equations  for imports  and  exports without 
taking into account the fact that current account balances are the 
difference  between a country's  production  and expenditures,  or, equiv- 
alently, the difference  between domestic saving and investment.  These 
flows are connected by an intertemporal  budget constraint that also 
involves the initial  stock of net foreign  claims. Hence, he believed that 
the current  account  deficit  can be traced  back  to the incentives  for saving 
and  investment.  Martin  Baily  responded  that  although  the federal  deficit 
has had a major  influence  on the trade deficit, it presumably  works by 
affecting  national  income, the exchange  rate, and  relative  prices. There- 
fore, apart  from  possible  estimation  difficulties  arising  from  endogeneity, 
he found nothing  wrong with focusing on how those variables  affected 
imports  and  exports  without  estimating  the whole model. He did  suggest, 
however, that  the estimates  might  be affected  if the domestic  component 
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The reported  low rate of return  earned  on direct foreign investment 
provoked  discussion among  the panelists. William  Brainard  urged  cau- 
tion in interpreting  the estimates. He found it unlikely that foreigners 
systematically  selected worse investments than the typical American 
investor,  indeed  so much  worse that  their  return  has been lower than  the 
return  on government  securities. Baily suggested that the low returns 
could be the result of transfer pricing policies designed by foreign 
investors  to generate  profits  at home. He noted that if imported  factors 
of production  are  being  systematically  overpriced  then  imports  are  being 
overstated. William  Cline added that the plausible  alternative  assump- 
tions about rates of return  have a major effect on projections of the 
current  account deficit a few years out. Cline and Robert  Gordon  both 
expressed  misgivings  about  the Houthakker-McGee  effect, especially  in 
light  of recent work by Paul  Krugman  that suggests that it is impossible 
to disentangle  income elasticities  from  time trends. 
Gordon  noted  that  using  the BEA deflator  for  computer  prices  doubles 
the current  weight attributed  to computers  in GNP relative to the base 
year of 1982.  Further,  use of the BEA deflator  gives them virtually  zero 
weight before 1975.  He did not agree, however, that it is correct  to use 
the BLS deflator instead, since it does  not correct for changes in 
performance. He recommended use of chain-weight  or fixed-weight 
deflators.  Also, he noted that the problems  with the BLS measure  are 
not limited to computers because the BLS makes inadequate  quality 
adjustments for many components. Gordon pointed out that other 
countries  do not use similar  computer  deflators;  the much  greater  growth 
rate  of U. S. computer  output,  due  largely  to this  measurement  difference, 
helps to explain why measured  productivity  in the United States has 
grown  so much  faster  in the manufacturing  than  in the nonmanufacturing 
sector, whereas in other countries the sectoral growth  rates are much 
closer together. 
Cline observed that some policymakers have been dismissive of 
model-based  predictions  of the current  account deficit. He applauded 
the paper  for challenging  that  assertion.  He agreed  with the emphasis  on 
slow growth  as an explanation  for the change in deficit, noting  that the 
recent reduction  in the trade deficit is a sign of weakness rather  than 
strength.  He also agreed  that the dollar  needs to decline about another 
10  percent  to reestablish  equilibrium. 
Gordon noted that since the exchange rate is back where it was in Robert Z. Lawrence  389 
1980,  and income growth  here and abroad  have been roughly  the same 
over the past decade, the $80 billion deterioration  in the U.S. current 
account may be the result of other forces. He felt the paper needed a 
discussion  of what  these other  forces were, and  whether  they were one- 
shot or trend  phenomena.  Robert  Lawrence  believed that the principal 
cause of the change in the current  account has been a diffusion  of U.S. 
technology  to the rest of the world.  He maintained  that  this effect should 
diminish  over time. 390  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  2:1990 
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